

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00

H-01 INR-05 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01

PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 BIB-01 /086 W

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P R 091631Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6712

INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 18950

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, MNUC, GW

SUBJECT: FURTHER GERMAN REACTION TO VLADIVOSTOK
NUCLEAR ACCORDS

BEGIN SUMMARY; THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION STUDY, THE VLADIVOSTOK NUCLEAR ACCORDS AND
RELATED U.S. FBS CONCESSIONS CONTINUES TO RECEIVE
TREATMENT IN THE FRG PUBLIC PRESS, WITH THE THEME NOW
BEING ECHOED BY THE OPPOSITION CDU/CSU DEFENSE SPOKES-
MAN. END SUMMARY

1- OVER THE WEEKEND THE GERMAN PRESS HAS CONTINUED TO
DISCUSS THE THEME OF THE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BREZHNEV'S AGREEMENT AT VLADIVOSTOK NOT TO INCLUDE
FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS (FBS) IN THE NUCLEAR ACCORDS WITH
POSSIBLE AMERICAN CONCESSIONS FOR REDUCING OR WITH-
DRAWING SUCH FORCES AS IMPLIED BY THE RECENT PUBLICATION
OF THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION STUDY. FOLLOWING A NEWS
ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE

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ON DECEMBER 4, THE PAPER'S NOTED POLITICAL-MILITARY

WRITER, ADELBERT WEINSTEIN, WROTE A LENGTHY NEWS ANALYSIS-TYPE ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE DECEMBER 6 EDITION ALLUDING TO THIS POSSIBLE DEAL.

2. WEINSTEIN WRITES THAT THE 7,000 AMERICAN NUCLEAR WARHEADS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE ARE ABOVE ALL OF POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. THEY ARE AN ELEMENT OF ATLANTIC SECURITY POLICY COMPARABLE TO THE U.S. 6TH FLEET, THE 7TH ARMY, AND THE TWELVE WEST GERMAN DIVISIONS. WEINSTEIN BELIEVES THAT CHANGES IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ANY OF THESE ELEMENTS - AS PROPOSED BY THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION STUDY - WOULD AFFECT STRATEGIC TABOOS AND DEPRIVE NATO DEFENSE PLANNING OF ITS SOLID BASIS.

3. WEINSTEIN STATED THAT A REDUCTION OF THE U.S. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEAD STRENGTH FROM 7,000 TO 2,000 WOULD FRIGHTEN PEOPLE AND GIVE RISE TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE U.S. IS TRYING TO RID ITSELF OF POLITICAL COMMITMENTS VIA A TECHNICAL DETOUR. WEINSTEIN PROFESSES TO SEE A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE UNOFFICIAL BROOKINGS PROPOSALS AND SECDEF SCHLESINGER'S OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT AS REFLECTED BY HIS IDEA OF "SELECTIVE TARGETING." IN CONCLUSION, WEINSTEIN SAID THAT "... WITHDRAWAL OF FBS FROM EUROPE WOULD BE AN AMERICAN CONCESSION HONORING BREZHNEV'S AGREEMENT WITH FORD NOT TO INCLUDE THESE SYSTEMS IN SALT."

4. THE ABOVE THEME HAS NOW ALSO BEEN PICKED UP BY THE CDU/CSU OPPOSITION. ON DECEMBER 5 THE OPPOSITION DEFENSE SPOKESMAN, MANFRED WOERNER, ISSUED A PRESS RELEASE WHICH VOICED MANY OF THESE SAME CONCERNS. WOERNER SAID THAT EUROPEANS HAVE A DIFFERENT EVALUATION OF THE NUCLEAR ACCORDS THAN THAT OF A "BREAKTHROUGH." HE THEN CONTINUED IN A POSITIVE VEIN BY STATING THAT THE GOAL OF STRATEGIC PARITY BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS IS IN THE EUROPEAN INTEREST. RENUNCIATION OF SUPERIORITY LEADS TO STABILIZATION, AND EUROPEANS CAN BE SATISFIED IF STABILIZATION IS NOT AT THE COST OF - STRATEGIC PROTECTION OF AMERICAN ALLIES. WHILE POINTING OUT THERE HAS BEEN UNCONTESTED PROGRESS, I.E.,

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THE TEN YEAR TERM OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT AND A LIMITATION ON THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES, WOERNER BELIEVES THAT QUESTIONS NEVERTHELESS REMAIN AND EUROPEANS ARE COMPELLED TO MAKE A MORE CAUTIOUS JUDGMENT.

5. WOERNER CONTINUES THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR A QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE, WITH A POSSIBLE DECISIVE ADVANTAGE FOR

THE SOVIET UNION UNLESS THROWWEIGHT AND THE NUMBER AND DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF MIRV WARHEADS ARE NOT REGULATED. WOERNER EXPRESSES THE FEAR THAT THE SOVIETS, BY CATCHING UP IN MIRV TECHNOLOGY, MIGHT MAKE THE U.S. STRATEGICALLY INFERIOR. AS A RESULT, THE U.S. MAY BE FORCED TO PRODUCE LARGER ROCKETS THEREBY CONTINUING THE QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE. ONLY WHEN A QUALITATIVE BALANCE IS REACHED IN

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GENEVA CAN ONE SPEAK OF A "BREAKTHROUGH." WOERNER EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE THROWWEIGHT AND MIRV NUMBER/DESTRUCTIVE POWER PROBLEM WILL SOMEHOW BE INCORPORATED IN THE AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED.

6- WOERNER STATES THAT THE EUROPEANS REQUIRE CLARIFICATION OF ONE QUESTION. THIS QUESTION IS THE PRICE THE U.S. PAID FOR THE FBS DECISION, WITH WOERNER SPECULATING THAT THE PRICE WAS EITHER REDUCTION OF FBS OR AGREEING

TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION IN ANOTHER NEGOTIATING FORUM. WOERNER NOTES THAT EXPERIENCE AND REALITY ARGUE AGAINST DOING THIS. U.S. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN EUROPE REPRESENT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVELS OF DETERRENCE. WOERNER RECOGNIZES THAT THE NUMBER OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS SHOULD NOT BECOME DOGMA, STATING THAT MODERNIZATION IS NECESSARY. HOWEVER, ANY CHANGE REQUIRES CONSULTATIONS SINCE EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED. TACTICAL
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NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE THE RESULT OF A MORE OR LESS CHANCY NEGOTIATING COMPROMISE, BUT RATHER MUST BE BASED ON RATIONAL AND UNDERSTANDABLE AGREED CRITERIA. WOERNER CONCLUDES HIS STATEMENT BY SAYING THAT IN NO CASE MAY A REDUCTION AFFECT THE SUBSTANCE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE.

7. COMMENT: THE WEINSTEIN ARTICLE AND WOERNER'S COMMENTS ARE EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS CURRENT IN THE FRG FOLLOWING THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING, AND THE LINES OF THOUGHT THEY EXPRESS WILL BE APPARENT IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER, WE IMAGINE' IN THE FRG POSITIONS AT THE NATO MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS THIS WEEK.
HILLENBRAND

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